



































This paper studies the welfare effects of wholesale price discrimination between down-
stream firms operating under different regulatory systems. I model a monopolistic inter-
mediate good market in which production cost differences between downstream firms may
be due to regulatory or technological asymmetries. Price discrimination reduces regulatory
distortions but may lower productive efficiency. Therefore, price discrimination increases
welfare if regulation is the dominant source of cost differences. This provides a novel welfare
rationale for exempting wholesale markets from the recent ban on geo-blocking in the EU.
Keywords: Price discrimination, Intermediate good markets, International price discrimi-
nation, Geo-blocking
JEL Classification: D43, L11, L42
1 Introduction
The recent EU regulation 2018/302 addresses the practice of geo-blocking, a form of geographic
price discrimination whereby a customer is denied access to an offer in a webshop based on her
location. The regulation bans geo-blocking on most final good markets.1 Its provisions apply
more broadly than the previously existing rules on international price discrimination following
from Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Vesala,
2019). Interestingly, wholesale markets are exempt from the regulation in so far as the traded
good is intended for “subsequent resale, transformation, processing, renting or subcontracting”.2
This paper provides a novel welfare rationale for the exemption of wholesale markets from
the ban on geo-blocking. The rationale builds on the fact that firms face different regulations
in different EU member states. As regulations are often costly to firms, regulatory differences
∗I thank Helmut Bester, Simon Cowan, Daniel Mu¨ller, Roland Strausz, and participants at EARIE 2019,
Oligo Workshop 2019, MaCCI conference 2019, and the Berlin Micro Colloquium for helpful comments.
†Freie Universita¨t Berlin, School of Business and Economics, Berlin (Germany), andreas.asseyer@fu-berlin.de
1The markets for audiovisual content and retail financial services are excluded according to Recital 9 of
Regulation 2018/302.
2Recital 16 of Regulation 2018/302.
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between states influence international production cost differences. At the same time, many
regulations provide benefits to other stakeholders. The regulation of collective bargaining influ-
ences wages and employee safety which are costly for firms and beneficial for employees. Taxes,
levies, and surcharges are direct costs to firms and finance public expenditures. Environmental
regulations lead to abatement costs and bring health benefits to the general population.
To study the welfare effects of wholesale price discrimination with regulatory differences, I
model a monopolistic intermediate good market in which downstream firms’ cost differences may
be due to asymmetries in production technology, regulation, or both. I compare total welfare
under discriminatory and uniform pricing by the upstream firm. The source of cost differences
may influence the welfare effects of price discrimination as technologies alone determine the
social production costs.
As the main result of this paper, I show that wholesale price discrimination often increases
welfare if regulation is the dominant source of cost differences between downstream firms. This
result holds even in environments where – in line with the existing literature – wholesale price
discrimination reduces welfare if cost differences arise solely from technological asymmetry.
Thus, the source of cost differences influences the welfare implications of wholesale price dis-
crimination. Moreover, the exemption of wholesale markets from the ban on geo-blocking can
be justified under the premise that regulation is an important source of cost variation within
the EU.
The following example illustrates the effect of national regulations on the social and private
production costs of firms. As Table 1 shows, electricity prices for non-household consumers vary
considerably across EU member states, ranging from e0.07 per kWh in Finland to e0.18 per
kWh in Cyprus. A considerable extent of this variation is due to national electricity consumption
taxes. A Polish firm which requires electricity to transform some intermediate good into a final
good pays e0.09 per kWh. Its German counterpart pays e0.15 per kWh. The price in Germany
includes e0.07 of tax payments per kWh whereas the price in Poland includes e0.015 of taxes.
In particular, German firms pay a renewables surcharge which finances the subsidies paid to
producers of electricity from renewable energy sources.3 All else equal, the German firm has
higher private marginal costs of production than the Polish firm due to the renewable surcharge.
However, the difference in social marginal costs of production is substantially lower than the
3In 2018, the surcharge was set at e0.0679/kWh (Bundesnetzagentur, 2017).
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Table 1: Electricity prices for non-household consumers, second half 2018. Source: Eurostat
difference in private marginal costs as the renewables surcharge is a transfer to producers of
low-carbon electricity.
The extant literature on the welfare effects of wholesale price discrimination assumes that
the social and private costs of production coincide (Katz, 1987; DeGraba, 1990; Yoshida, 2000;
Inderst and Shaffer, 2009; Herweg and Mu¨ller, 2014). This assumption is satisfied in the case of
pure technological asymmetry where the cost differences between downstream firms are entirely
due to efficiency differences in production technologies. The assumption is not satisfied if
downstream firms use the same production technology but experience different costs due to
exposure to different regulations. I refer to this case as pure regulatory asymmetry.
I add to the extant literature by analyzing the welfare effects of price discrimination if down-
stream firms may differ in their regulatory environment as well as their production technology.
Following the literature, I sequentially analyze the cases of linear wholesale tariffs (DeGraba,
1990; Yoshida, 2000) and nonlinear wholesale tariffs. With nonlinear tariffs, I allow for com-
plete information on production costs (Inderst and Shaffer, 2009) and private cost information
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of downstream firms (Herweg and Mu¨ller, 2014).
At first, I show that the source of cost differences affects the welfare implications of price
discrimination if wholesale tariffs are linear. In line with the results in the literature, price
discrimination reduces social welfare with pure technological asymmetry. By contrast, price
discrimination increases social welfare with pure regulatory asymmetry. Independently of the
source of cost differences, the upstream firm optimally offers a downstream firm with higher
private costs a lower wholesale price. Under uniform pricing, all firms receive the same interme-
diate wholesale price. With pure technological asymmetry, price discrimination therefore shifts
production from the downstream firm with lower social marginal costs to the downstream firm
with higher social marginal costs. This shift tends to decrease total welfare. In the case of
pure regulatory asymmetry, both downstream firms have the same production technology but
one downstream firm has higher private marginal costs due to regulation. Price discrimination
alleviates the regulatory burden on the high cost firm and reduces the distortion induced by the
regulation. This effect tends to increase total welfare.
Second, I allow for nonlinear wholesale tariffs and show that the upstream firm’s informa-
tion about downstream firms’ marginal costs determines whether the source of cost differences
matters for the welfare effects of price discrimination. If the upstream firm knows the marginal
costs, the source of cost differences does typically not matter for the welfare effects of price dis-
crimination. In this case, the upstream firm can extract all industry profits with discriminatory
two-part tariffs. With uniform pricing, Inderst and Shaffer (2009) show that the downstream
firms earn positive margins. Thus, the quantities on the final good markets and total welfare
are smaller with uniform pricing – independently of the source of cost differences. By contrast,
if the upstream firm does not observe the downstream firms’ marginal costs, a similar result to
the case of linear wholesale tariffs arises. Price discrimination favors the downstream firm with
the worse cost structure. If the cost disadvantage stems from technology, price discrimination
induces more production by the less efficient firm and tends to reduce welfare. If the cost disad-
vantage is due to regulatory differences, price discrimination reduces the regulatory distortion
and tends to increase welfare.
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Related literature The literature on price discrimination in intermediate good markets
starts with Katz (1987).4 He shows that price discrimination can be detrimental for welfare if
larger downstream firms have the possibility to engage in inefficient backward integration by
producing an input instead of buying it.5
This paper belongs to the part of the literature that does not assume an option of back-
ward integration. Downstream firms only differ with respect to their production costs.6 All
extant articles in this literature posit that social and private production costs coincide. De-
Graba (1990) and Yoshida (2000) consider the case of linear wholesale tariffs and demonstrate
that price discrimination reduces total welfare if demand is linear. O’Brien and Shaffer (1994),
Inderst and Shaffer (2009), and Herweg and Mu¨ller (2014) analyze the case where the upstream
firm sets non-linear tariffs. O’Brien and Shaffer (1994) and Inderst and Shaffer (2009) assume
that the upstream firm is perfectly informed about the downstream firms’ production costs. In
O’Brien and Shaffer (1994), the upstream firm may secretly renegotiate the tariff with down-
stream firms and this renegotiation leads to lower prices with price discrimination. In Inderst
and Shaffer (2009), contracts are public and a ban on price discrimination induces the upstream
firm to increase the marginal wholesale price. This reduces welfare compared to price discrimi-
nation. Herweg and Mu¨ller (2014) consider the case where the downstream firms have private
information about their production costs. They show that price discrimination lowers welfare
if downstream markets are covered.
Regulatory asymmetry provides a welfare rationale for wholesale price discrimination which
does not depend on the form of wholesale contracts or the upstream firm’s information about
production costs. The negative welfare results of DeGraba (1990), Yoshida (2000), and Herweg
and Mu¨ller (2014) rely on the dominance of technological asymmetry. The positive welfare
result of Inderst and Shaffer (2009) is robust to the introduction of regulatory asymmetry.
In the following section, I introduce the model. In Section 3, I analyze the model with
linear wholesale tariffs. Section 4 presents the analysis for the case of nonlinear tariffs with
either complete or private information about marginal costs. Section 5 extends the analysis to
4Robinson (1933) provides the first formal analysis of the welfare effects of price discrimination in final good
markets. Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers (2010) and Cowan (2012) generalize her insights.
5Inderst and Valletti (2009) analyze the effect of price discrimination on long-run investment incentives in the
model of Katz (1987). O’Brien (2014) extends Katz (1987) to allow for more general sources of bargaining power.
6Arya and Mittendorf (2010) study wholesale price discrimination if some downstream firms reach more final
good markets. Miklo´s-Thal and Shaffer (2019) study price discrimination across downstream markets.
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a setting with downstream competition. Section 6 provides a discussion and I conclude with
Section 7.
2 The model
An upstream firm U produces an intermediate good at zero marginal cost for two downstream
firms D1 and D2 which serve separate final good markets.
7 I refer to the final good market
served by Di as market i for i ∈ {1, 2}. Both downstream markets have the same thrice
differentiable inverse demand function P (q) with P ′(q) < 0 for q > 0.8 The revenue on market
i is denoted by R(q) ≡ qP (q). Each downstream firm Di with i ∈ {1, 2} can transform qi units
of the intermediate good into qi units of the final good at a private marginal cost of xi. The
social marginal cost of this transformation is denoted by ci and may differ from the private
marginal cost. Thus, social welfare on market i for the quantity qi and social marginal cost
ci is given by wi(ci, qi) ≡
∫ qi
0 (P (q) − ci)dq. The socially optimal quantities satisfy qoi = qo(ci)
for P (qo(ci)) = ci and i ∈ {1, 2}. I impose the following assumption on the inverse demand
function.
Assumption 1. The inverse demand function P (q) satisfies
a) P ′(q) + qP ′′(q) ≤ 0,
b) 2P ′(q) + 4qP ′′(q) + q2P ′′′(q) ≤ 0,
c) −R′′′(q)R′′(q) = −3P
′′(q)+qP ′′′(q)
2P ′(q)+qP ′′(q) ≤ −P
′(q)
P (q) .
By Part a) of Assumption 1, the revenue function R(q) ≡ qP (q) is strictly concave and the
monopoly problem on each market is well-behaved. This assumption is used throughout this
paper. Part b) is equivalent to qR′′(q) being decreasing. Parts a) and b) jointly imply that the
expression qR′(q) is strictly concave. This assumption ensures that the upstream firm’s choice
of a linear wholesale price in Section 3 is well-behaved. Part c) of Assumption 1 is needed for
the welfare analysis with private information about marginal costs in Section 4 and requires
that marginal revenue R′(q) is less concave in q than social welfare w(ci, q).9
7The assumption of separate markets seems a natural starting point for the analysis of international price
discrimination. I consider the case of competition in Section 5.
8Villas-Boas (2009) shows that wholesale price discrimination tends to increase welfare with asymmetric
demand. Thus, the assumption of identical markets is the strongest test of the effect of regulatory asymmetry.
9Given a), R′′′(q) ≤ 0 is a sufficient condition for b) and c). Assumption 1 allows for some convexity of
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A microfoundation for the difference between social and private costs
I provide a microfoundation for the difference between social and private marginal costs. Many
regulations are equivalent to taxing an input into the downstream firms’ production process. In
the example of the renewable surcharge discussed in the introduction, electricity usage is taxed.
Similarly, regulations regarding the rights of labor unions affect wages and therefore tax labor.
The microfoundation follows the example of the tax on electricity consumption. Suppose
each downstream firm Di with i ∈ {1, 2} requires capital and electricity to transform the inter-
mediate good into the final good. The production function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., to transform
one unit of the intermediate good into one unit of the final good, Di requires capital Ki and




i = 1 with α ∈ (0, 1). Let Ri denote the price of
capital and Wi the price of electricity. For each unit of electricity consumption, a tax of Ti
has to be paid. Moreover, each unit of electricity consumption leads to a negative externality
of Ni > 0. The externality consists of negative effects on the health of the general popula-
tion, environmental damage, and the costs of climate change for future generations. Di’s cost
minimization problem is given by
min
Ki,Ei




















private marginal cost of downstream firm Di is
xi = RiK
∗










Under the assumption that the prices Ri and Wi equal the opportunity costs, the social marginal
cost of production is given by
ci = RiK
∗














We can therefore write xi = aici where
ai =
(




There is a wedge between social and private marginal costs if the tax on electricity is not equal
to the Pigouvian tax, i.e., Ti 6= Ni. There are a number of reasons why regulators in country i
might not perfectly internalize the negative externality of electricity consumption. If the total
negative externality Ni can be split up in a negative externality on country i denoted by N
i
i
and a negative externality on the other country j given by N ji , the regulator might set the
individually optimal tax rate Ti = N
i
i < Ni. The regulator in country i might set an even lower
tax rate Ti < N
i
i if the voters of the governing political party would be strongly affected by a
higher electricity tax or have a lower valuation for an intact environment.
The wedges between private and social costs are asymmetric if the ratios Wi+NiWi+Ti differ. For
two countries with x1 < x2, N1 ' N2, W1 'W2, and T1 < T2, we have a1 < a2. The difference
between social marginal costs is smaller than the difference in private marginal costs.
3 Linear wholesale tariffs
In this section, I suppose that the upstream firm is restricted to set linear tariffs consisting
of wholesale prices wi with i ∈ {1, 2}. The case of linear tariffs is considered in DeGraba
(1990) and Yoshida (2000) with downstream competition. In the context of international price
discrimination, independent downstream markets are a natural starting point.10
First, I define pure regulatory asymmetry and pure technological asymmetry as two polar
cases of interest. Let ∆x ≡ x2−x1 and ∆c ≡ c2− c1 denote the differences in private and social
marginal costs. Without loss of generality, let ∆x > 0, i.e., D1 is the stronger downstream
firm. If ∆x = ∆c, we are in the case of pure technological asymmetry. Here, the difference in
private marginal costs across downstream firms fully reflects the difference in social marginal
costs. By contrast, if ∆c = 0, we are in the case of pure regulatory asymmetry which represents
a situation where differences in private marginal costs are not at all driven by differences in
social marginal costs.
10The case of competition is analyzed in Section 5.
8
Next, I analyze the equilibria with linear tariffs under price discrimination and uniform
pricing. I show that the stronger downstream firm sells a higher quantity and faces a higher
wholesale price under price discrimination. Put differently, the weaker downstream firm’s cost
disadvantage is partially offset under price discrimination. With uniform pricing, both down-
stream firms face an intermediate price. The stronger downstream firm produces more and the
weaker downstream firm produces less under uniform than under discriminatory pricing.
If U sets a wholesale price wi, Di optimally orders the quantity
q∗i (wi) ≡ arg maxq R(q)− (wi + xi)q
which satisfies R′(q∗i (wi)) = wi + xi if the solution is interior. Under price discrimination, U ’s
optimal wholesale price on market i is the solution to maxwi wiq
∗
i (wi). U ’s choice of a wholesale
price wi is equivalent to the direct choice of the quantity qi – provided the wholesale price
satisfies wi = R
′(qi)−xi. Thus, U ’s profit maximization problem on market i can be written as
maxqi qi(R
′(qi) − xi). This problem is well-behaved by Parts a) and b) of Assumption 1. The
optimal quantities qd1 and q
d
2 solve the first-order condition
R′(qdi )− xi + qdiR′′(qdi ) = 0
for i ∈ {1, 2}. As qR′(q) is strictly concave by Assumption 1, ∆x > 0 implies qd1 > qd2 . The




′(qd1)− x1 = −qd1R′′(qd1) ≥ −qd2R′′(qd2) = R′(qd2)− x2 = wd2
where the inequality follows from qd1 > q
d
2 and part b) of Assumption 1. Thus, U optimally sets
a higher wholesale price for the stronger downstream firm. However, the price difference does
not offset D1’s cost advantage.





2(w)). U ’s choice of a uniform wholesale price is equivalent to choosing the
quantities q1 and q2 directly for the wholesale price w = R
′(qi)− xi for i ∈ {1, 2}. The second
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interpretation gives rise to the program
max
q1,q2
(R′(q1)− x1)q1 + (R′(q2)− x2)q2 subject to R′(q1)− x1 = R′(q2)− x2.
Using a Lagrangian approach with multiplier λ, the optimal quantities under uniform pricing
qu1 and q
u
2 are given by
R′(qu1 )− x1 + (qu1 − λ)R′′(qu1 ) = 0 and R′(qu2 )− x2 + (qu2 + λ)R′′(qu2 ) = 0.






2 . Thus, the optimal uniform wholesale tariff satisfies
wu ∈ [wd2 , wd1 ]. It follows that price discrimination lowers the sales of the stronger downstream
firm D1 and increases the sales of the weaker downstream firm D2.
Next, I compare total welfare under price discrimination W d with the total welfare under
uniform pricing W u for varying sources of cost differences.
Proposition 1. Suppose wholesale tariffs are linear and both downstream firms supply positive
quantities. If the total output under price discrimination and uniform pricing is sufficiently
similar, price discrimination increases welfare with pure regulatory asymmetry and decreases
welfare with pure technological asymmetry. More generally, there exist ε > 0 and aˆ ∈ (0, 1) such
that |qd1 + qd2 − qu1 − qu2 | < ε⇒W d ≥W u ⇔ ∆c∆x ≤ aˆ.
With linear wholesale tariffs, the source of the private cost difference between downstream
firms determines the welfare effect of price discrimination if the total quantity is similar under
price discrimination and uniform pricing. Suppose the total quantity is the same under both














2 , a switch from uniform pricing to price
discrimination reallocates output from the low price market 1 to the high price market 2. The
marginal welfare effect of such a shift in output is the difference in prices net of social marginal
costs P (q2)−P (q1)−∆c. The reallocation of one unit of the good from the low valuation marginal
consumer on market 1 to the high valuation marginal consumer is beneficial. The benefit is
measured by the price difference P (q2) − P (q1). However, the reallocation leads to additional
social costs of ∆c. With pure regulatory asymmetry, redistributing output is cost-free and
reduces the distortion induced by the regulation. Thus, price discrimination increases welfare
in this case. With pure technological asymmetry, the marginal welfare effect of redistributing
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output from market 1 to market 2 is negative. The benefits of shifting output from the low
to the high price market are smaller than the costs of redistribution. In particular, for all
q1 ∈ [qd1 , qu1 ] and q2 = Q− q1
P (q2)− P (q1) ≤ P (qu2 )− P (qu1 ) = ∆x− qu2P ′(qu2 ) + qu1P ′(qu1 ) ≤ ∆x = ∆c
where the first equality follows from the uniform pricing condition R′(qu2 )−R′(qu1 ) = ∆x and the
last inequality follows from qu1 > q
u
2 and qP
′(q) being decreasing due to Part a) of Assumption 1.
Thus, price discrimination lowers productive efficiency under pure technological asymmetry.
Proposition 1 supposes that the total quantity is similar with price discrimination and
uniform pricing. For which demand functions is this a valid assumption?
Remark 1. Suppose wholesale tariffs are linear and both downstream firms supply positive
quantities. If demand is linear, the total quantity is identical under price discrimination and
uniform pricing .
The instance of linear demand is of particular interest as DeGraba (1990) and Yoshida
(2000) focus on this case.
4 Nonlinear wholesale tariffs
In this section, I allow the upstream firm to offer arbitrary nonlinear tariffs. I consider two
different informational setups. First, I suppose that the upstream firm perfectly observes the
downstream firms’ marginal costs. This case is considered in Inderst and Shaffer (2009) under
the assumption of pure technological asymmetry. Second, I assume that the downstream firms
have private information about their marginal costs. This case is studied in Herweg and Mu¨ller
(2014) under pure technological asymmetry.
Complete cost information
At first, assume the upstream firm observes the downstream firms’ costs. Under price discrim-
ination, U cannot do better than to offer each downstream firm Di a two-part tariff consisting
of a fixed fee fi and a per-unit price wi. With uniform pricing, U has to offer both downstream
firms the same two-part tariff (f, w).
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The difference between private and social marginal costs does not influence the equilibrium
analysis of Inderst and Shaffer (2009). Given a per-unit price wi, Di orders the quantity q
∗
i (wi).
With price discrimination, U optimally sets wdi = 0 and f
d
i = maxq R(q)−xiq. With these tariffs,
U achieves the profit it could attain by producing the final good itself at the same marginal
costs as the downstream firms. The resulting optimal quantities equal the monopoly quantities
qmi ≡ q∗i (0) for i ∈ {1, 2} on the final good markets. With uniform pricing, Proposition 3 in
Inderst and Shaffer (2009) states that U optimally sets a strictly positive per-unit price wu.
Thus, the quantities on both markets are strictly smaller under uniform pricing as q∗i (w
u) < qmi
for wu > 0 and i ∈ {1, 2}. The reason behind this result is as follows. With uniform pricing,
the optimal fixed fee f is bounded by the weaker downstream firm’s profit for a given per-unit
price w, i.e., f = maxq R(q)−(x2 +w)q. If U slightly increases the per-unit price w from zero to
a positive value, U experiences a second-order loss in profit from the weaker downstream firm
D2 and a first-order gain in profit from the stronger downstream firm D1.
The results of Inderst and Shaffer (2009) are robust to varying sources of cost differences if
higher output increases social welfare. This is the case if there is underproduction with price




i ≤ qoi for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proposition 2. Suppose wholesale tariffs may be nonlinear, marginal costs are publicly known,
both downstream firms supply positive quantities, and there is underproduction with price dis-
crimination and uniform pricing on both markets. Price discrimination increases welfare. In
particular, price discrimination increases welfare with pure regulatory and pure technological
asymmetry.
With public information on costs, the source of cost differences is not relevant for the welfare
effect of price discrimination. As Inderst and Shaffer (2009) show, price discrimination leads
to higher quantities on both downstream markets. If price discrimination leads to underpro-
duction from a social perspective, i.e., qmi ≤ qoi , higher quantities lead to higher total welfare
independently of the source of cost differences.
As the next section demonstrates, the source of cost difference is only irrelevant with non-
linear tariffs if marginal costs are public information. With private information, the difference
between private and social marginal costs changes the welfare effect of price discrimination.
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Private cost information
Suppose now that the upstream firm cannot observe marginal costs. Each downstream firm
Di with i ∈ {1, 2} is privately informed about its private marginal cost xi ∈ [xi, xi] drawn
from the distribution Gi(xi). Let the densities gi(xi) = G
′(xi) be strictly positive on (xi, xi).
For a private marginal cost xi, the social marginal cost of Di is given by ci = si(xi) where
si(x) is a strictly increasing function with the image [c, c] ⊆ R+. Thus, the inverse function
σi(ci) ≡ s−1i (ci) exists and gives for each value of social marginal cost the associated private
marginal cost. It follows that the social marginal cost ci of Di is distributed according to the
distribution function Fi(ci) ≡ Gi(σi(ci)).11
Next, I define pure technological asymmetry and pure regulatory asymmetry in this context.
For σ1(c) = σ2(c), the cost difference between D1 and D2 is entirely due to technology. This
case of pure technological asymmetry between downstream firms is studied in Herweg and Mu¨ller
(2014). With pure regulatory asymmetry, the downstream firms use identical production tech-
nologies which implies F1(c) = F2(c) for all c ∈ [c, c]. In this case, the cost difference between
D1 and D2 can entirely be attributed to regulatory differences. If the downstream firms in the
microfoundation of Section 2 have private information about their opportunity cost of capital,
then we have σi(c) = aic where ai is defined in equation (1).
I make the following assumption regarding G1 and G2.
Assumption 2. The distribution functions {Gi(x)}i=1,2 satisfy the following conditions:
1. Γi(x) ≡ x+ Gi(x)gi(x) is strictly increasing,
2. Γ(x) ≡ x+ G1(x)+G2(x)g1(x)+g2(x) is strictly increasing,
3. γ(x) ≡ g2(x)g1(x) is weakly increasing.
Parts 1 and 2 of the assumption ensure that the optimal tariffs under price discrimination
(Part 1) and uniform pricing (Part 2) do not lead to bunching of different cost types. These
conditions are equivalent to the standard regularity assumption in the literature on non-linear
pricing. The third part of the assumption states that the cost distribution of D2 is less favorable
than the cost distribution of D1 in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio property. Thus,
D2 is assumed to be the weaker firm.
11The relationship between social and marginal cost need not be deterministic. As only the conditional expected
social marginal cost E[ci|xi] matters for welfare, one may define si(xi) ≡ E[ci|xi] and is back to the original model.
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The timing of the interaction between U , D1, and D2 unfolds as follows. At the beginning
of the game, marginal costs x1 and x2 are drawn. Next, U offers a tariff T1(q1) to D1 and a
tariff T2(q2) to D2. These tariffs imply that Di can order a quantity qi of the intermediate good
at a total payment of Ti(qi). D1 and D2 can accept or reject their offer. If Di rejects, it receives
an outside option of value zero. Finally, production takes place and payoffs realize. I impose
no restrictions – such as linearity – on the tariffs T1(q1) and T2(q2).
Optimal tariffs
I start with the analysis of U ’s optimal wholesale tariffs under price discrimination. An optimal





s.t. qi(xi) ∈ arg max
q
R(q)− xiq − Ti(q) ∀xi ∈ [xi, xi], (ICi)
max
q
R(q)− xiq − Ti(q) ≥ 0 ∀xi ∈ [xi, xi]. (PCi)
The constraint (ICi) captures that Di orders its preferred quantity for any value of private
marginal cost. The constraint (PCi) ensures that Di accepts the offered tariff. The profit maxi-
mization problem can be solved using standard techniques as provided in the clear exposition by
Martimort and Stole (2009). The solution to this problem is presented in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. With price discrimination, U offers the tariff T di (qi) to Di, Di accepts the offer,
and orders a quantity qdi (xi). T
d
i (qi) and q
d
i (xi) are given by










(·) is the inverse of qdi (ci) with (qdi )−1(0) = x˜i ≡ inf
{
x ∈ [xi, xi] : qdi (x) = 0
}
.
Under the optimal tariff, the virtual industry profit on market i is maximized. As equation
(3) shows, the virtual industry profit is the difference between revenue and the virtual private
marginal cost Γi(xi) which consists of the private marginal cost and the margin of Di. Under
the optimal tariff T di (·), Di chooses the quantity that maximizes the virtual industry profit.
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The following remark addresses the question which downstream firm is favored under price
discrimination.
Remark 2. Under price discrimination, U favors the weaker downstream firm D2.
The monotone likelihood ratio property implies that the inverse hazard rates are ranked
as G1(c)/g1(c) ≥ G2(c)/g2(c). Thus, the remark follows from the classical trade-off between
efficiency and rent extraction. D1 has a more favorable distribution of private marginal cost.
Thus, the upstream firm has a stronger incentive to reduce the output of D1 for high cost
realizations to lower the firm’s information rent for low cost realizations.
Next, I analyze optimal uniform pricing. If price discrimination is not permitted, U has to
offer the same tariff T (q) to both downstream firms. As under price discrimination, U needs
to take into account the downstream firms’ optimal quantity choices and their participation







s.t. qi(xi) ∈ arg max
q
R(q)− xiq − T (q), ∀xi ∈ [xi, xi], ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (ICui )
max
q
R(q)− xiq − T (q) ≥ 0 ∀xi ∈ [xi, xi], ∀i ∈ {1, 2} (PCui )
The problem Pu is technically equivalent to the problems Pd1 and Pd2 with the additional non-
discrimination constraint T1(·) = T2(·). This constraint connects the two otherwise independent
problems. The optimal tariff under uniform pricing is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. With uniform pricing, U offers the tariff T u(q) to D1 and D2, both accept the tariff
and order each the quantity qu(x). T u(q) and qu(x) are given by




qu(x) = arg max
q
R(q)− Γ(x)q, (5)
where (qu)−1(·) is the inverse of qu(x) with (qu)−1(0) = x˜u ≡ inf {x ∈ [x, x] : qu(x) = 0} and
qu(x) ∈ [qd1(x), qd2(x)].
The additional constraint T1(·) = T2(·) can be expressed in terms of virtual private marginal
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Thus, the virtual private marginal costs under uniform pricing are a weighted average of the
virtual private marginal costs with price discrimination. As Γ(x) ∈ [Γ2(x),Γ1(x)], the quantity
schedule and the optimal tariff under uniform pricing lie between the quantity schedules and
the optimal tariffs under price discrimination.
Welfare analysis
In the welfare analysis, I compare the expected welfare under price discrimination and uniform
pricing. First, I derive sufficient conditions for price discrimination to increase or decrease social
welfare. I then use this result in the cases of pure regulatory and pure technological asymmetry
as well as intermediate cases.
It is helpful for the welfare analysis to state the quantity schedules as functions of social
marginal cost instead of private marginal costs. Define the inverse function of marginal revenue
ρ(z) =

R′−1(z), z ≤ P (0)
0, z > P (0)
which exists due to the strict concavity of R(q). Using equations (3) and (5), define qˆdi (c) ≡
qdi (σi(c)) = ρ(Γi(σi(c))) and qˆ
u
i (c) ≡ qu(σi(c)) = ρ(Γ(σi(c))) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j as the
mappings from social marginal costs to quantity. Given a quantity schedule qˆi(ci), the (expected)
welfare on market i is Wi(qˆi(·)) ≡
∫
wi(ci, qˆi(ci))dFi(ci). Total (expected) welfare is given by
W (qˆ1(·), qˆ2(·)) ≡W1(qˆ1(·)) +W2(qˆ2(·)).
In the subsequent analysis, I suppose that there is underproduction with price discrimination
and uniform pricing. Formally, this requires that the equilibrium quantities qˆji (c) are lower than
the socially optimal quantity qo(c) for all i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {d, u}, and c ∈ [c, c]. The following
important intermediate result provides sufficient conditions for price discrimination to increase
or decrease total welfare.
Lemma 3. Suppose wholesale tariffs may be nonlinear, marginal costs are private information
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of downstream firms, both downstream firms always supply positive quantities, and there is
underproduction with price discrimination and uniform pricing on both markets.
1. Price discrimination increases welfare if for all c ∈ [c, c]
Γ1(σ1(c)) ≤ Γ2(σ2(c)) and (7)
f1(c)Γ1(σ1(c)) + f2(c)Γ2(σ2(c)) ≤ f1(c)Γ(σ1(c)) + f2(c)Γ(σ2(c)). (8)
2. Price discrimination decreases welfare if for all c ∈ [c, c]
Γ1(σ1(c)) ≥ Γ(σ2(c)), Γ2(σ2(c)) ≤ Γ(σ1(c)), and (9)
f1(c)Γ1(σ1(c)) + f2(c)Γ2(σ2(c)) ≥ f1(c)Γ(σ1(c)) + f2(c)Γ(σ2(c)). (10)
First, I explain the sufficient conditions for price discrimination to be welfare-increasing.
Condition (7) requires that – for the same social marginal cost c – the weaker downstream
firm receives a lower quantity than the stronger downstream firm under price discrimination.
If this is the case, the better contractual terms for the weaker downstream firm under price
discrimination offset its disadvantage only partially. Moreover, condition (7) implies that the
price on market 1 is lower than the price on market 2 for the same social marginal cost of serving
these markets. Under uniform pricing, the disadvantage for the weaker downstream firm is larger
and the gap between prices on the final good markets is wider. Price discrimination reallocates
the good from the marginal consumer on market 1 to the marginal consumer on market 2. As
the marginal consumer on market 1 has a lower valuation for the good, price discrimination
tends to increase total welfare.
However, the welfare effect of price discrimination depends on the total quantity produced
under price discrimination and uniform pricing. If the total quantity is larger under price
discrimination and there is underproduction, total welfare is higher than under uniform pricing.
Even if total quantity is slightly lower under price discrimination, total welfare is still higher as
the allocation of goods across the final good markets is more efficient. Condition (8) requires
that the weighted sum of virtual marginal costs of both downstream firms is smaller under
price discrimination than under uniform pricing. Together with part c) of Assumption 1, this
17
implies that the total quantity under price discrimination is sufficiently large – albeit potentially
smaller than the total quantity under uniform pricing – to ensure that price discrimination leads
to higher total welfare than uniform pricing.
Next, I discuss the sufficient conditions for price discrimination to be welfare-decreasing.
Conditions (9) and (10) mirror conditions (7) and (8). Under condition (9), the weaker down-
stream firm receives a larger quantity under uniform pricing than the stronger downstream firm
under price discrimination. Moreover, the weaker firm receives a higher quantity under price
discrimination than the stronger firm under uniform pricing. Both statements hold for identi-
cal values of social marginal cost. The first inequality in (9) further implies that the weaker
downstream firm receives a higher quantity than the stronger firm with price discrimination and
identical social marginal costs. Thus, the price on market 2 is smaller than the price on market
1 for the same social marginal cost under price discrimination. A shift to uniform pricing re-
duces the price difference without completely offsetting it. Thus, a ban on price discrimination
reallocates the good from a low valuation marginal consumer on market 1 to a high valuation
marginal consumer on market 2. This reallocation is welfare-improving. Under condition (10),
the weighted sum of virtual marginal costs – for the same value of social marginal costs – is
lower under uniform pricing. Together with Assumption 1, this implies that the total quantity
under uniform pricing is sufficiently large to ensure that – given underproduction – total welfare
is higher under uniform pricing.
Next, I use Lemma 3 to derive welfare results for pure regulatory and pure technological
asymmetry as well as intermediate cases.
Proposition 3. Suppose wholesale tariffs may be nonlinear, marginal costs are private infor-
mation of downstream firms, both downstream firms always supply positive quantities, and there
is underproduction with price discrimination and uniform pricing on both markets.
1. Price discrimination increases welfare with pure regulatory asymmetry if σ′1(c) ≤ σ′2(c).
2. Price discrimination decreases welfare with pure technological asymmetry.
3. The more the cost advantage of the stronger downstream firm D1 is based on technology,
the smaller the welfare gain from price discrimination.
The proposition shows that the source of cost differences between downstream firms may
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play a crucial role with nonlinear tariffs if the upstream firm does not know marginal costs. If
downstream firms differ only with respect to their production technology, price discrimination
is detrimental to welfare. However, if downstream firms use the same production technology
but face different regulatory regimes, price discrimination may increase welfare. In particular,
price discrimination increases welfare if the sensitivity of the private marginal cost to changes
in the social marginal cost is weakly larger for the weaker downstream firm. This condition is
for instance satisfied in the microfoundation of Section 2 if the downstream firms have private
information about their cost of capital and the opportunity cost of capital is identical. In this
case, σ′1(c) = a1 < σ′2(c) = a2. A higher cost of capital induces a downstream firm to substitute
capital for electricity consumption which is less expensive for the downstream firm with a lower
tax on electricity.
Price discrimination becomes less beneficial for welfare, the larger the extent to which the
cost advantage of the stronger downstream firm D1 is due to technology. Thus, the intermediate
cases between pure technological and pure regulatory asymmetry also lead to intermediate














P (q)dq − si(xi)(qdi (xi)− qui (xi))
)
dGi(xi).
Consider the addition of a positive function ε(x1) to s1(x1) holding the distribution G1 fixed.
This reduces the part of the cost advantage of D1 which is based on technology. As D1 produces
less under price discrimination than under uniform pricing, adding ε(x1) to s1(x1) makes price
discrimination relatively more attractive from a welfare perspective. If the positive function
ε(x2) is added to s2(x2), then a smaller share of D2’s cost disadvantage can be explained by
a technology difference. As D2 produces more under price discrimination than under uniform
pricing, the welfare effect of price discrimination increases.
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5 Downstream competition
In this section, I allow for competition on the final good market. The assumption of separate
markets is a natural starting point to analyze international price discrimination. Nevertheless,
even small downstream firms may reach consumers in other states via online trading platforms.
Therefore, downstream competition may be relevant.
I focus on the case of linear wholesale tariffs and linear demand. In particular, suppose there
is a representative consumer with the quadratic utility function






For the final good prices p1 and p2, the first-order conditions of the consumer’s utility maxi-
mization problem maxq1,q2 U(q1, q2)− p1q1 − p2q2 imply the linear demand system
Pi(qi, qj) = 1− qi − βqj for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
The goods are imperfect substitutes if β ∈ [0, 1). Given the wholesale prices w1 and w2, the
downstream firms compete in quantities.
I analyze the equilibrium of this game by backwards solution. After U has chosen the whole-
sale prices, the downstream firms play the unique Cournot equilibrium (q∗1(w1, w2), q∗2(w2, w1))
with
q∗i (wi, wj) =
2(1− xi − wi)− β(1− xj − wj)
4− β2 for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
Under price discrimination, the upstream firm’s optimal wholesale prices (wd1 , w
d
2) are the so-
lution to the profit maximization problem maxw1,w2 w1q
∗
1(w1, w2) + w2q
∗
2(w2, w1). It is easy
to check that the optimal wholesale prices are given by wdi =
1−xi
2 for i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, the
stronger downstream firm pays a higher wholesale price. The equilibrium quantities (qd1 , q
d
2) can








2(4−β2) for i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j.





The optimal uniform wholesale price wu = 2−x1−x24 solves the profit maximization problem. The
equilibrium quantities are given by (qu1 , q
u




4(4−β2) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}
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and i 6= j. Observe that wu lies between the discriminatory prices wd1 and wd2 . Moreover, the
stronger downstream firm produces more and the weaker downstream firm produces less under
uniform pricing. Finally, note that the total quantities are identical under price discrimination







The equilibrium analysis implies the following result with respect to welfare.
Proposition 4. Suppose the downstream firms compete, wholesale tariffs are linear, and both
downstream firms supply positive quantities. If demand is linear and goods are imperfect sub-
stitutes, price discrimination increases welfare with pure regulatory asymmetry and decreases
welfare with pure technological asymmetry. More generally, there exists aˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that
W d ≥W u ⇔ ∆c∆x ≤ aˆ.
The underlying reason for this result is the following. As in the case of linear demand with
separate markets, the total quantity is identical under price discrimination and uniform pricing.
Thus, a switch from uniform pricing to price discrimination shifts production from the stronger
to the weaker downstream firm without affecting total output. The marginal welfare effect of
this reallocation is P2(q2, q1)−P1(q1, q2)−∆c. P2(q2, q1)−P1(q1, q2) measures the benefit from
redistributing production from the low to the high price firm. This benefit is strictly positive
if the goods are imperfect substitutes, i.e., if β < 1. ∆c is the additional production cost
that results from the shift of production and can therefore be seen as the cost of reallocation.
With pure regulatory asymmetry, the reallocation is cost-free. Price discrimination lowers the
regulatory distortion and increases welfare. With pure technological asymmetry, the marginal
cost difference ∆x = ∆x exceeds the price difference P2(q2, q1)−P1(q1, q2) for all q1 ∈ [qd1 , qu1 ] and
q2 = Q− q1.12 Thus, price discrimination reduces welfare with pure technological asymmetry.
6 Discussion
The model and analysis of this paper apply to any setting of wholesale price discrimination by
a monopolistic upstream firm in which the social and private costs of dowstream firms differ.
Section 2 provides a microfoundation for the difference between social and marginal costs which
is based on suboptimal regulation. If the regulation of a negative production externality in one
country does not take into account the externality on other countries, corrective tax rates are
12See the proof of Proposition 4 for details.
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too low. Private costs therefore do no internalize the social costs completely. In the following,
I discuss two alternative microfoundations.
Differences between social and marginal costs may also be driven by varying preferences of
the populations in different states. The median attitude towards labor unions may influence
regulations of collective bargaining and the resulting bargaining power of labor unions. If two
firms are located in countries with starkly different attitudes towards collective bargaining,
the firms might have very different labor costs even with identical production technologies.
Within the EU, labor union coverage is indeed very diverse. In France, union coverage is almost
universal. By contrast, only slightly more than a quarter of employees enjoy the right to bargain
in the UK (OECD, 2019, pp.44). For a formalization, reconsider the example of Section 2 with
the interpretation that input Ei represents labor, Wi is the opportunity cost of labor, and Ti
is the mark-up above Wi through collective bargaining. The externality term Ni can be set to
zero. If two countries have similar opportunity costs of labor W1 ' W2 but different mark-ups
T1 > T2, the difference between social marginal costs across the two countries is smaller than
the difference betwen private marginal costs.
The model can also be applied to settings where social and private costs differ for other
reasons than regulation. I describe an example where an asymmetric market structure induces
a wedge between social and private costs. Consider the following extension of the model of
Section 2. Both downstream firms require one unit of a second intermediate good to transform
the good sold by the upstream firm U into a final good. Downstream firm Di with i ∈ {1, 2}
can buy this second intermediate good from one of two suppliers Sai or S
b
i . The suppliers have
constant marginal costs of cai and c
b











2 = c < c
b
2 = x. If x is not too far
from c, Bertrand competition between the suppliers leads to the equilibrium prices ωa1 = ω
b
1 = c
and ωa2 = ω
b
2 = x. Thus, the private marginal costs of transforming one unit of the intermediate
good sold by U into the final good are x1 = c for D1 and x2 = x for D2. The social marginal
costs are c1 = c for D1 and c2 = c for D2. As in the case of pure regulatory asymmetry, private
costs differ across downstream firms whereas the social costs are the same.
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7 Conclusion
This paper studies the welfare effects of wholesale price discrimination between downstream
firms operating under different regulatory systems. I analyze a model of a monopolistic inter-
mediate good market where production cost differences between downstream firms may be due
to differences in production technology, in the regulatory environment, or both. Like production
technologies, regulations influence the production costs of firms. In addition, many regulations
provide benefits to other members of the economy. Thus, the difference in private production
costs of downstream firms operating under different regulations may exceed the difference in
social production costs.
I show that the source of cost differences matters for the welfare effects of price discrimina-
tion. Price discrimination reduces regulatory distortions but may lower productive efficiency.
Therefore, price discrimination increases welfare if regulation is the dominant source of cost
differences and decreases welfare if cost differences are mainly due to technological asymmetry.
Thus, this paper provides a novel welfare rationale for the exemption of wholesale markets from
the recent ban on geo-blocking in the EU under the premise that regulatory asymmetries are
an important source of cost differences.
The main result suggests a positive relation between the degree of regulatory harmonization
of states and the benefits of regulating geographic wholesale price discrimination. If regulatory
differences are removed, technology becomes the dominant source of cost differences. A ban
on geo-blocking in intermediate good markets might therefore become more attractive after a




Proof of Proposition 1




(P (q)− c1)dq +
∫ qd2
0
(P (q)− c2)dq −
∫ qu1
0














(P (q)− a∆x)dq −
∫ qu1
qd1
P (q)dq − c1δ (11)
where the last equality uses qd1 + q
d
2 − qu1 − qu2 ≡ δ and a ≡ ∆c∆x . The proposition is implied
by the following three observations. First, expression (11) is strictly decreasing in a. Second,
expression (11) is strictly positive for a = 0 and δ → 0 as P (q) is strictly decreasing, qu2 < qd1 ,






P (q)dq − c1δ <
∫ qd2
qu2
(P (qu2 )−∆x)dq −
∫ qu1
qd1
P (qu1 )dq − c1δ
= (qd2 − qu2 )(P (qu2 )− P (qu1 )−∆x)− (c1 − P (qu1 ))δ
= (qd2 − qu2 )(qu1P ′(qu1 )− qu2P ′(qu2 ))− (c1 − P (qu1 ))δ
where the step from the second to the third line follows from R′(qu1 )−R′(qu2 ) = ∆x. As δ → 0,
the expression in the third line becomes negative as qu1 > q
u
2 and qP
′(q) is decreasing by Part a)
of Assumption 1.
Proof of Remark 1
Suppose demand is linear, i.e., P (q) = 1− q. Given a wholesale price wi, Di orders the quantity









2 . It is easy to verify that U optimally
sets wdi =
1−xi
2 with i ∈ {1, 2}. This induces the quantities qdi = 1−xi4 with i ∈ {1, 2}. With








2 . It can be quickly
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verified that U optimally sets wu =
2−xi−xj





i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Finally, note that qu1 + qu2 = 4−2x1−2x28 = qd1 + qd2 .
Proof of Proposition 2
The proposition follows from the discussion in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1
Define the variable Πi(xi) = maxq R(q) − xiq − Ti(q). By standard arguments, the incentive
compatibility constraint ICi is equivalent to Π
′
i(xi) = −qi(xi) and qi(xi) being non-increasing.















subject to Πi(xi) ≥ 0 and qi(xi) non-decreasing in xi. Under Assumption 2, the solution to this
problem is given by Πi(xi) = 0 and q
d
i (xi) = arg maxq R(q) − Γi(x)q. T di (·) can be computed
using the condition R′(qdi (x)) − x = (T d1 )′(qdi (x)) which implies R′(q) − (qdi )−1(q) = (T di )′(q)
where (qdi )
−1(y) is the inverse function of qdi (x), precisely defined in the Lemma. Using this and
T di (0) = 0 gives the result.
Proof of Remark 2


















Thus, equation (3) implies qd1(x) ≤ qd2(x) for all x and T d1 (q) ≥ T d2 (q) for all q.
Proof of Lemma 2
Define the variable Π(xi) = maxq R(q)−xiq−T (q). Note that (ICu1 ) and (ICu2 ) imply qi(xi) =
q(xi) for i ∈ {1, 2}. By standard arguments, the incentive compatibility constraints (ICui ) with
i ∈ {1, 2} are equivalent to Π′(xi) = −q(xi) and q(xi) being non-increasing. Define x ≡ mini{xi}
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(g1(x) + g2(x))dx− 2Π(x)
subject to Π(xi) ≥ 0 and q(x) non-decreasing in x. Under Assumption 2, the solution to this
problem is given by Π(x) = 0 and qu(x) = arg maxq R(q) − Γ(x)q . T u(·) can be computed
using the condition R′(qu(x)) − x = (T u)′(qu(x)) which implies R′(q) − (qu)−1(q) = (T u)′(q)
where (qu)−1(y) is the inverse function of qu(x), precisely defined in the Lemma. Using this
and T u(0) = 0 gives the result. Finally, Γ(x) ∈ [Γ2(x),Γ1(x)] implies qu(x) ∈ [qd1(x), qd2(x)].
Proof of Lemma 3
To prove the proposition, I use the following property of concave functions. Consider the
function k : R → R and the vector x = (x′1, x′2, x′′1, x′′2) ∈ R4. Without loss of generality, let
x′1 ≤ x′2 and x′′1 ≤ x′′2.
Lemma 4. Suppose k is decreasing and concave on [min{x},max{x}]. If x satisfies x′1 ≥ x′′1,
and αx′1 + (1 − α)x′2 ≤ αx′′1 + (1 − α)x′′2 for some α ∈ [0, 1], then αk(x′1) + (1 − α)k(x′2) ≥
αk(x′′1) + (1− α)k(x′′2).
Proof. Define xˆ′2 ∈ R by αx′1 + (1 − α)xˆ′2 = αx′′1 + (1 − α)x′′2. Note that x′2 ≤ xˆ′2 ≤ x′′2.
Together with x′1 ≥ x′′1, this implies that there exist β1 ∈ [0, 1] and β2 ∈ [0, 1] such that x′1 =
β1x
′′
1 + (1−β1)x′′2 and xˆ′2 = β2x′′1 + (1−β2)x′′2. The definition of xˆ′2 implies αβ1 + (1−α)β2 = α.
Note that
αk(x′1) + (1− α)k(x′2) ≥ αk(x′1) + (1− α)k(xˆ′2)
≥ α(β1k(x′′1) + (1− β1)k(x′′2)) + (1− α)(β2k(x′′1) + (1− β2)k(x′′2))
= αk(x′′1) + (1− α)k(x′′2)
where the first step follows from k being decreasing on [min{x},max{x}], the second step is
implied by concavity of k, and the last step follows from αβ1 + (1− α)β2 = α.
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1(c), c) + f2(c)w(qˆ
d
2(c), c)− f1(c)w(qˆu1 (c), c)− f2(c)w(qˆu2 (c), c)
}
dc.
For each c ∈ [c, c], it holds that
f1(c)w(qˆ
d
1(c), c) + f2(c)w(qˆ
d
2(c), c)− f1(c)w(qˆu1 (c), c)− f2(c)w(qˆu2 (c), c) =
f1(c)w(ρ(Γ1(σ1(c)), c) + f2(c)w(ρ(Γ2(σ2(c)), c)− f1(c)w(ρ(Γ(σ1(c)), c)− f2(c)w(ρ(Γ(σ2(c)), c).
I now want to apply Lemma 4 to the function w(ρ(·), c) to prove the proposition. Note first
that w(ρ(z), c) is decreasing in z for z ∈ Z(c) ≡ Conv{Γ1(σ1(c)),Γ2(σ2(c)),Γ(σ1(c)),Γ(σ2(c))}.
This follows from ρ(z) being decreasing in z and underproduction under price discrimination
and uniform pricing. Next, I show that under part c) of Assumption 1, w(ρ(z), c) is concave in
z for ρ(z) > 0. For z ∈ Z(c) and ρ(z) > 0, the second derivative satisfies
∂2
∂z2








which is negative under Part c) of Assumption 1 as P (ρ(z))− c > 0 due to underproduction.
The result now follows from Lemma 4 as condition (7) implies Γ(σ1(c)) ≤ Γ1(σ1(c)) ≤
Γ2(σ2(c)) ≤ Γ(σ2(c)) and condition (9) implies Γ(σi(c)) ∈ [Γ2(σ2(c)),Γ1(σ1(c))] for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof of Proposition 3
I start with the following helpful lemma.
Lemma 5. If σ′2(c) ≥ σ′1(c) for all c ∈ [c, c], then inequality (7) implies inequality (8).
Proof. Using fi(c) = gi(σi(c))σ
′



























due to g2(x)/g1(x) being increasing by Assumption 2.
I can now prove the proposition as follows. For the case of pure regulatory asymmetry, it is
by Lemma 5 sufficient to check that σ′1(c) ≤ σ′2(c) implies inequality (7). As F1(c) = F2(c) =




f(c) . Equation (7) is therefore satisfied
if σ1(c) ≤ σ2(c) and σ′1(c) ≤ σ′2(c) where the latter implies the first as σ1(c) ≤ σ2(c).
For the case of pure technological asymmetry, σ1(c) = σ2(c) = σ(c) implies that condition
(9) is satisfied due to equation (6) and Γ1(x) ≥ Γ2(x). Next, note that the right-hand side of
inequality (10) simplifies to (f1(c) + f2(c))Γ(σ(c)). Furthermore, due to fi(c) = gi(σi(c)σ
′
i(c),
the left-hand side of (10) satisfies
f1(c)Γ1(σ(c)) + f2(c)Γ2(σ(c)) = (f1(c) + f2(c))σ(c) + σ
′(c)(G1(σ(c)) +G2(σ(c)))
= (f1(c) + f2(c))Γ(σ(c)).
Thus, condition (10) is satisfied with equality. Point 3. follows from the discussion in the main
text.
Proof of Proposition 4
Denote the total quantity under price discrimination and uniform pricing by Q. Define





(Q− q1)2 − βq1(Q− q1)− c1q1 − c2(Q− q1)





(Q− q1)2 − βq1(Q− q1) + a∆xq1






1 ). The marginal welfare effect of
redistributing from market 1 to market 2 is given by W ′Q(q1) = (1− β)(Q− 2q1) + a∆x.
First, I prove W d > W u for a = 0. As W ′Q(q1) is decreasing in q1, W
′
Q(q1) < 0 for
q1 ∈ [qd1 , qu1 ] is equivalent to W ′Q(qd1) < 0. Moreover, W ′Q(qd1) = (1 − β)(qd2 − qd1) < 0 as the
stronger downstream firm produces more under price discrimination and β < 1.
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Second, I prove that W u > W d for a = 1. For a = 1, W ′Q(q
u
1 ) > 0 implies W
′
Q(q1) > 0 for
q1 ∈ [qd1 , qu1 ] as W ′Q(q1) is decreasing in q1. Moreover,
W ′Q(q
u
1 ) = (1− β)(Q− 2qu1 ) + ∆x = (1− β)(qu2 − qu1 ) + ∆x = −
1− β
2− β∆x+ ∆x =
∆x
2− β > 0.
Third, there exists a cutoff value aˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that W d ≥ W u ⇔ ∆c∆x ≤ aˆ. This result
follows from W d −W u being strictly decreasing in a as
W d −W u = −
∫ qu1
qd1
W ′Q(q)dq = −
∫ qu1
qd1
[(1− β)(Q− 2q) + a∆x]dq
and the previous observations that W d > W u for a = 0 and W d < W u for a = 1.
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